Transitions to democracy are good settings to observe possible changes of beliefs, attitudes and values. This paper analyzes shifts in democratic beliefs during Argentine political transition towards democracy. Through the analysis of different surveys in the period 1982-8 diverse patterns concerning two sets of democratic attitudes were observed. Those dealing with participatory democracy proved to be not only highly supported but also stable throughout the period. On the other hand the libertarian orientations exhibit lower consensus and proved to be much more unstable. They grew at the beginning of the transition but later a regression to pre-transition levels took place, associated with the increase of socio-economic discontent. Also a relationship between less libertarian democratic attitudes and lower socio-economic levels was observed.
attitudes arising from new political structures. Cases such as the Federal Republic of Germany or Spain show that the mere act of replacing totalitarian or authoritarian systems by democratic institutions may encourage the emergence of significant changes in the beliefs of the people. (See Verba, 1965; Conradt, 1980; Herz, 1982; Lopez Pintor, 1982 .) Political transition implies a growing acquaintance with the new regime; as Rustow (1970) maintains, 'the acceptance of these rules is logically a part of the transition process itself rather than a prerequisite of that process'. It is on the basis of these contentions that relevant changes in the population's political attitudes may be expected during the Argentine transition in the aftermath of the Malvinas War of 1982. The democratic transition in Argentina was preceded by a cultural heritage whereby political experience with military governments, characterized by authoritarian procedures, demobilization attempts and discrediting political activity in general-has met with the experience resulting from long populist periods distinguished by the presence of massive political mobilization and charismatic leadership.
Raul Alfonsin, the first constitutional president of the democratic transition, expressed his awareness regarding the nature of Argentina's political culturewhich proved to be unfavorable for democracy in the past-and the need to introduce changes in that culture in order to facilitate and strengthen the emergence of democratic political structures.' The Government of the Radical party has reinstated the rule of law, the system of public liberties and political participation, in virtue of which a sequence of electoral acts have taken place since 1983: parliamentary elections in 1985; legislative and provincial elections in 1987, and the presidential elections in 1989. At the same time, Alfonsin's government suffered a number of economic failures that have led to growing discontent in the population and to defeat by the Peronists in the elections of 1987 and 1989. In order to secure the cultural bases of the political system, new democratic structures would have to operate within a context characterized by the confluence of a cultural legacy scarcely favorable to democracy and growing economic difficulties. The impact of this context may be observed through a sequence of measurements regarding attitudes of support for democracy studied since the beginning of transition.
DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD

157
THE TWO IDEALS OF DEMOCRACY
The idea of democracy has historically included two main streams of thought: one of them, mainly Anglo-Saxon, stresses the libertarian ideal; the other one, of continental origins, emphasizes the idea of egalitarianism (Sabine, 1952) . The former view, appearing alongside the Puritan Revolution, with demands for greater religious tolerance, associates freedom with tolerance and the recognition of political minorities. From that point on, a number of political institutions (like Parliament and the Judiciary) have developed in order to secure those liberties. This viewpoint has stressed the separation of Church and State, and has underscored the difference between public and private interests, which has led to a clearly protective stance, mainly in connection with coercian as wielded from political power (Sartori, 1962) . On the other hand, the egalitarian doctrine has stressed the notion of citizenship, which regulates the rights and duties of individuals vis-a-vis political power in a uniform manner. The extension of citizenship has basically meant the denial of adscriptive privileges. The concept of political egalitarianism has reached its greatest institutional expression in universal suffrage.
From a historical perspective, political democracy has combined both traditions, the libertarian and the egalitarian ideals. Extending universal suffrage and citizenship has been strongly linked to freedom of association, development of political parties and respect for minorities and their different types of expression. From a political viewpoint, democracy as a political system is characterized by those two dimensions, taking into account the philosophical principles already mentioned. According to Robert Dahl (1972) , poliarchies are political regimes in which competitive politics and inclusiveness are both strongly built in political devices and institutionalized phenomena.
Beliefs linked to these dimensions have been seen as relevant factors for the endurance of a democratic system (Griffith et al., 1956; Prothro and Grigg, i960; Dahl, 1972 ). People's ideas about democracy are hardly irrelevant to the stability of a political regime based upon democratic institutions. Undoubtedly, a complex set of routines and norms comes between people's beliefs and the traits of the political regime, but it is difficult to imagine that an actively anti-democratic society could coexist with a democratic regime. As Dahl (1972, p. 126 ) points out, 'It seems evident that individuals' beliefs influence collective actions, and Samples corresponding to SIP and ESTUDIOS surveys followed probabilistic procedures for the selection of square-blocks and the quota system for the age and sex of the respondents.
All surveys mentioned above applied structured questionnaires, and the interviews took place in the respondents' homes. hence the structure and functioning of institutions and systems'. Dahl (1972, p. 130 ) also states that 'to believe in the institutions of polyarchy means to believe, at the very least, in the legitimacy of both public contestation and participation. In practice, these two dimensions of polyarchy are somewhat independent not only historically, but also as beliefs.'
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT THE ARGENTINE CASE
In Argentina a difference in the degree of support bestowed upon participative and libertarian values is verified, with a greater attachment to the former than to the latter. The extensive consensus to participative values is clearly reflected in the fact that three fourths of the population support the universal vote and periodical elections as bases for the political system. These attitudes-which according to our data existed prior to the transition-became stronger in 1983, when an 'opening' in political life took place during the final stages of the military regime (Table 1) . In contrast to participatory dimensions, libertarian aspects of democracy receive a lower level of support from society on the whole. Actually, agreement with indicators such as tolerance of democracy, opposition to a one-party system, rejection of government control over the press and respect for minorities, hardly exceed on the average 50 per cent of the replies. In these cases, an increase in pro-democratic attitudes during the 'opening up' of the authoritarian regime was also verified. However, between 1984 and 1988, a regression to pretransition levels took place-as occurs with acceptance of a multi-party system or of levels even lower than those observed in pre-transition years, such as 'respect for minorities' and 'democratic tolerance' (Table 2 ). In short, the popu- lation support for participatory aspects of democracy is not only greater than support for liberties or freedom, but also proves to be more stable over time.
Analyzing how pro-participative attitudes were socially distributed in recent years shows how wide support of these dimensions is in every social strata. This trend has not changed significantly over time. In contrast, when indicators of pluralism and tolerance are involved there is a clear association between socioeconomic levels and pro-democratic attitudes. Lower sectors of the population show less consensus than the middle and higher sectors regarding the latter dimensions of democracy. This association persisted throughout the transition period without significant changes. However, some indicators of undemocratic attitudes seem to increase in lower and marginal sectors of the population. Regarding respect for political minorities, after a wide consensus was observed in all social sectors at the beginning of the transition, non-libertarian attitudes gained strength in those strata towards 1986 (Table 3) .
When the 'education' factor is introduced and the 'socio-economic level' controlled, 'education' was seen to have a strong effect on the pro-or antidemocratic attitudes of the libertarian dimension. This not only means that the most educated people within each social stratum are more democratic, but also that attitudinal differences due to social conditions decline significantly given similar levels of education. The strong association between democratic attitudes and education level reaches its peak when indicators of tolerance and pluralism are considered. However, that correlation may also be verified regarding participative attitudes, although in this case it is not as strong as in the first (Table 4) .
Evidence gathered from the Argentine case parallels associations described by Lipset (1963) and Germani (1966) linking anti-libertarian attitudes to a socioeconomic level: according to these authors, those attitudes become more frequent as the socio-economic condition of the population declines. Lipset (1963) also contends that this correlation is to a large degree linked to 'education', this factor being generally associated with a lower status. In his book Political Man, he states that 'the degree of formal education, itself closely correlated with social and economic status, is highly correlated with undemocratic attitudes ' (1963, p. 101). Attachment to democratic values is also related to discontent: people expressing a stronger disappointment with the situation tend to exhibit weaker democratic attitudes than those who are satisfied. The link between discontent and weaker democratic commitments is stronger when 'tolerance' is involved than when participative attitudes are considered. On the other hand, democratic intolerance seems to be more determined by discontent with the country's situation as a whole than by personal dissatisfaction. This relationship becomes particularly relevant due to the strong increase of discontent throughout the transition period (Tables 5 and 6 ).
The uneven support given to participative and libertarian dimensions clearly shows that in Argentine political culture different types of people may be found with regard to their attachment to those dimensions of democracy. On the basis of two statements considered as indicators for the participative and the libertarian dimensions a typology can be constructed and quantified. The participative dimension is indicated by the agreement or disagreement with a system of periodical elections. The libertarian dimension is indicated by attitudes towards the statement that 'democracy is dangerous because it brings disorder and disorganization'. Those people who support both dimensions would have attitudes reflecting a deeper commitment to democracy, at least in the participative and libertarian traditions. The opposite type, that is to say, those who reject both dimensions of democracy-would exhibit clearly authoritarian attitudes. The two 'mixed types' would be represented by people supporting participative but not libertarian attitudes (termed as 'populists') and individuals supporting libertarian values but rejecting the participative contents of democracy (called 'elitists'). Analyzing the typology of individuals, the prevalence of 'democrats' among the population, can be clearly seen (52 per cent), although the 'populist' sector also has a very significant presence (35 per cent). On the other hand, 'authoritarians' (8 per cent) and 'elitists' (5 per cent) only represent small minorities (Figure 1) . A relationship between socio-economic level and the presence of 'democrats' and 'populists' may be also observed. While on the one hand, a positive association between 'democrats' and socio-economic level may be found, on the other hand, a negative correlation may be identified: 'populism' tends to increase as the socio-economic level of individuals declines. Among the lower social strata, the proportion of 'populists' exceeds that of 'democrats' ( Table 7) . It is also interesting to note the difference between un-specialized and specialized workers: among the former, the proportion of'popuhsts' exceeds that of 'democrats'; among the latter, the proportion of 'democrats' increases while that of 'populists' decreases. Democratic attitudes increase among younger groups, in the older age groups the trend towards populism becomes more significant. Among the youngest groups, the presence of 'democrats' is much larger than that of'populists'; among older people (55 years old and up) the tendency to favor 'democrats' is slight (Table 8) .
CONCLUSIONS
The Argentine case exhibits a pattern of highly consensual and permanent dis- positions regarding the participative dimensions of democracy during, and even prior to the transition period. These attitudes seem to be firmly rooted in Argentine political culture since they have not undergone significant changes, and a strong attachment to them crosses the different social sectors. In contrast, values related to tolerance and political pluralism not only receive much less support, but have also suffered a certain decline throughout the transition, seemingly associated with the increasing level of discontent. However, this pattern appears unevenly distributed within the population, with the least support for tolerance and pluralism coming from the lowest and least educated social strata.
Analyzing the data shows the almost null impact democratic institutionalization had on democratic attitudes, at least during the first five years of constitutional government. These findings clearly call into question the socializing influence of democratic institutions, at least during relatively brief periods marked by important economic difficulties.
Argentina seems to maintain certain elements of its past populist culture, characterized by the prevalence of the participative dimensions of democracy, dispositions which, as Germani (1966) has pointed out, stemmed to a large extent, from experiences of direct rather than institutionalized participation. At the same time, attachment to dimensions linked to pluralism and political tolerance is much lower, with pockets of authoritarianism found among the lowest and least educated social sectors. In short, Argentine political culture, in connection to democracy, seems to show a mixed pattern, in which democratic attitudes coexist with populist-rather than authoritarian-tendencies.
This structure may be seen as the result of a number of formal and informal cultural factors which emphasized participative forms of political behavior under the tutelage of strong leaderships. The political attitudes mentioned above reached their maximum expansion during the Peronist regime (1946-55), but they also developed vigorously during Radical and Conservative periods: their origins may be traced to 'caudillismo', a political style dominant in Argentina during the past century. Low attachment to libertarian principles might be linked to the fact that there were no struggles for religious tolerance in the past, as was the case in Anglo-Saxon cultures.
If cultures with long-established pluralist and libertarian traditions are excluded, the emergence of these attitudes demands an extended period of socialization under a democratic political regime. In the case of recently established democracies where strong expectations and social demands prevail, as well as populist traditions, this kind of socialization is highly dependent upon the success of that regime in satisfying those expectations.
Argentina is an example of recurrent successions of populist and authoritarian regimes. All the available evidence suggests that the populist legacy has proved stronger and more enduring than the authoritarian heritage-at least as reflected in the attitudes of the population as a whole and in striking indicators such as greater populist tendencies among older people. On the other hand, the election of a charismatic figure like Menem after five and a half years of democratic transition leaves little room for doubt that in the face of economic frustration, the population's preferences once again strengthened the populist option, at least in the short term. The old populist presence, left behind half a decade ago due to the vigor of democratic restoration, seems to revive as the people's economic frustration grows.
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